Giles v California

Shuman-Powell on Giles v. California

Robert Shuman-Powell has posted Giles v. California: A Move Toward Equilibrium in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In Giles v. California, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether California’s interpretation of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, obviating purposeful intent, was an established exception to the Confrontation Clause at the time of the founding. The Court held that it was not; a defendant who purposely intends and succeeds in preventing a witness from testifying forfeits his right to confront him.

This note discusses the case, the origins of the Confrontation Clause, and its exceptions in English common law. It argues that the Court appropriately resolved historical ambiguity in the common law in favor of a rule that constrains judicial discretion and reverses the erosion of constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants. It further asserts that the Court is willing to find purposeful intent when the forfeiture doctrine is invoked in a domestic violence context.

Through Giles, the Court moved toward resolving an imbalance between two countervailing forces: a constitutional protection afforded criminal defendants and the maxim upon which the forfeiture doctrine rests. On the one hand, the Court ensured that all citizens would enjoy the right of confrontation by refusing to lower the constitutional bar to admitting testimony from an absent witness. On the other, the Court offered flexibility in order to minimize any possible windfall granted to criminal defendants in domestic abuse situations. Only time, and a test case, will tell if the Court fulfills the promise it made in Giles.

 

Who can testify as to what it is……

Norris on Testimony about Lab Results

Jesse J. Norris (Beloit College) has posted Who Can Testify About Lab Results after Melendez-Diaz? The Challenge of Surrogate Testimony to the Confrontation Clause (American Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a certificate presenting forensic lab results was testimonial evidence, and that defendants thus have the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the analyst. Despite this ruling, courts remain divided on the question of surrogate testimony: when can an expert witness, such as a lab supervisor or outside expert, testify in place of the analyst? How this question is answered has enormous consequences for the future of the Confrontation Clause and the criminal justice system more generally. Widespread surrogate testimony threatens to undermine confrontation rights and contribute to false convictions, yet banning it altogether could result in defendants going free whenever the forensic analyst is unavailable and the test cannot be repeated.

This Article rejects the main justifications for surrogate testimony. In doing so, it develops four arguments against the common claim that a surrogate’s independent analysis of analyst-generated data precludes Confrontation Clause violations. The Article contends that most surrogate testimony likely violates the Confrontation Clause, and that this is clearest when the surrogate relies on analyst-produced data that is itself testimonial evidence. In addition, the Article presents a test for determining whether the data upon which the surrogate relies is testimonial.

The Article proposes an alternative standard for admitting surrogate testimony in some limited circumstances. Unlike previous proposals, this standard is consistent with the logic of Crawford v. Washington and faithful to the principles of the Confrontation Clause. Surrogate testimony should be admitted when the data relied upon by the surrogate is clearly nontestimonial, and excluded when it is testimonial. Yet when the testimonial status of the data is ambiguous, the analyst is genuinely unavailable, and a second test is impossible, courts should consider several factors in deciding whether to admit the testimony. These include the trustworthiness of the evidence, the nature of the surrogate’s analysis, the degree to which the data’s validity is dependent on the analyst, and the possibility that failure to admit the evidence would endanger public safety by acquitting a factually guilty, dangerous defendant.

March 17, 2011 | Permalink

 

Doj and medical marijuana…..

Mikos on the DOJ and Medical Marijuana

obert A. Mikos (Vanderbilt Law School) has posted A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana (Stanford Law & Policy Review, Vol. 201, p. 101, 2011) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Obama Administration has embarked upon a much-heralded shift in federal policy toward medical marijuana. Eschewing the hard-ball tactics favored by earlier Administrations, Attorney General Eric Holder announced in October 2009 that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would stop enforcing the federal marijuana ban against persons who comply with state medical marijuana laws. Given the significance of the medical marijuana issue in both criminal law and federalism circles, this Article sets out to provide the first in-depth analysis of the changes wrought by the DOJ’s new Non Enforcement Policy (NEP). In a nutshell, it suggests that early enthusiasm for the NEP is misguided; on close inspection, the NEP represents at most a very modest change in federal policy. First, the NEP won’t necessarily stop federal agents from pursuing criminal prosecutions of marijuana dispensaries. In a twist of irony, the non-enforcement policy itself is not enforceable. It doesn’t create any legal rights a court could invoke to dismiss a criminal case. And the DOJ itself will have a difficult time ensuring that federal prosecutors comply with the agency’s stated policy. Second, even assuming the NEP would block criminal prosecutions, federal law could still obstruct state medical marijuana programs by imposing – or enabling others to impose – a wide range of civil and private sanctions on medical marijuana users and their suppliers. The problem is the NEP doesn’t repeal the federal ban on marijuana. Marijuana technically remains illegal under federal law, and the possession, cultivation, or distribution of the drug trigger a host of civil sanctions not addressed by the NEP. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) can deny federal housing subsidies to medical marijuana users, and pharmaceutical companies could potentially bring civil RICO actions against marijuana dispensaries. What is more, the federal ban arguably preempts states from shielding marijuana users and dispensaries from sanctions imposed by private parties. For example, employers can likely skirt liability under state law for discriminating against employees who use marijuana for medical purposes. Metaphorically, the federal ban is a hydra, only one head of which has been severed by the NEP (and one that could too easily be regrown). The labor of ending federal prohibition is not yet complete.

 

Interesting article on non-capital habeas….

Blume, Johnson & Weyble on Non-Capital Habeas

Weyble keirJohn H. Blume Sheri Lynn Johnson and Keir M. Weyble (pictured) (all of Cornell Law School) have posted In Defense of Non-Capital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King (Cornell Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 101, 2011) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

For decades, federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments has generated wide-ranging, sometimes heated, debate among judges, policymakers, and scholars. In their 2009 Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, Professors Joseph L. Hoffmann and Nancy J. King added their voices to the exchange, contending that federal habeas corpus review of noncapital state court convictions and sentences should, with narrow exceptions, be abolished. They contend that the expenditure of money, time, and effort necessary to provide review in such cases is no longer justifiable and that those resources should be redirected to creating a federal initiative for improving trial-level representation in which states could choose to participate.

This Article begins with a systematic examination of Hoffmann and King’s arguments for the abolition of noncapital habeas corpus review. It demonstrates that although state postconviction review systems may have evolved since the 1960s, federal habeas corpus continues to play an important role in encouraging meaningful state court review and providing a safety net for deserving prisoners whom the state courts have failed. It next explains that Hoffmann and King’s proposal for near-abolition of noncapital habeas review would be unlikely to yield substantial net reductions in habeas litigation, both because many prisoners (correctly or incorrectly) would invoke the statutory exceptions and because many others would litigate the adequacy of state postconviction review under the Suspension Clause. This Article then challenges the assumption that states would respond to the abolition of noncapital habeas review by voluntarily improving their own systems for delivering adequate trial-level representation absent an affirmative incentive to do so. Finally, it suggests an alternative set of reforms, beginning with reducing the United States’ extraordinarily high incarceration rate and modifying three areas of existing habeas law, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of habeas corpus review in noncapital cases.

March 15, 2011 | Permalink

 

Did Miranda go far enough….

Geoffrey S. Corn (South Texas College of Law) has posted The Missing Miranda Warning: Why What You Don’t Know Really Can Hurt You on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Miranda – at least the core rule that statements made by suspects in response to custodial interrogation are admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief only following a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights – has survived decades of attacks. While the “stormy seas” the decision navigated produced a wake of academic study of the wisdom of the decision, little attention has been focused on an equally logical question: did Miranda go far enough? If, as the Miranda Court emphasized, the purpose of Miranda’s warnings was to ensure criminal suspects were provided a meaningful opportunity to exercise their privilege against self-incrimination, why has Miranda never debilitated law enforcement in the ways predicted when the decision was handed down?

Three apparent answers emerge. First (as Justice Scalia periodically asserts), perhaps waiver and confession by a criminal suspect is a natural, logical, and laudable action motivated by contrition and the desire to accept responsibility for criminal wrongdoing – a natural product of human catharsis. This conclusion is suspect. If true, the interrogation techniques on which police routinely rely to obtain confessions (albeit after a valid Miranda waiver) would generally be unnecessary; suspects would be inclined to confess of their own immediate volition. Second, perhaps the whittling away of the breadth of the Miranda decision by subsequent jurisprudence has rendered Miranda a practical nullity? This explanation is equally unlikely considering most confessions are obtained in the traditional custodial interrogation environment where compliance with Miranda remains a requirement for admissibility of these confessions. Third, perhaps the Miranda warnings never truly achieved their intended objective: to restore confidence that a suspect’s decision to cooperate during a police interrogation is the product of his own decision and not governmental coercion. If the purpose of the warnings was to educate a criminal suspect of his inconsequential right to refuse to assist the government in establishing his guilt, perhaps suspects do not clearly and completely understand that right?

This article will assert that, contrary to the criticism that Miranda was overly protective of the rights of criminal suspects, the warnings required by that decision are in fact not protective enough. This accounts for the reality that most criminal suspects waive their rights and facilitate their own convictions. More specifically, this article will assert that, from the outset of the warning and waiver requirement established by the Miranda decision, what is perhaps the most important warning has never been required: that silence in the face of an allegation is never incriminating. This “missing” Miranda warning is, in the opinion of the author, perhaps the most important warning a suspect confronted with custodial interrogation requires to meaningfully exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, and yet it is the one warning that has never been required. Without this warning, the suspect is left to fear the instinctual expectation that silence in the face of accusation will be inferred by the accuser as guilt. Without being informed of the constitutional prohibition against such inferential guilt, the suspect is left to choose between standing on the right to silence and “looking guilty,” or attempting to explain to the accuser why the accusation is erroneous. When considered from this perspective, it becomes easily understandable why a suspect would choose to enter into a dialogue with the interrogator, even knowing full well “anything said or done can be used against you in a court of law.” In short, unless the suspect understands that saying nothing cannot be used against him, the risk that what he does say may be used against him seems far less significant.

This underinclusiveness is a necessary consequence of any rule of presumption, and does not in the abstract justify abandoning Miranda and reverting back to the case-by-case voluntariness test it effectively replaced. Acceptance of this consequence has been a central theme of all post-Miranda jurisprudence. However, tolerance is not synonymous with the conclusion that underinclusiveness is unavoidable. Instead, the recognition of underinclusiveness warrants consideration of whether it is genuinely inevitable and unavoidable, or whether it is the result of a defect in the method used to strike the balance Miranda sought to achieve? If the answer is the latter, then considering how Miranda should be adjusted is both logical and appropriate. Perhaps because Miranda has been under attack since its inception, this question has received virtually no consideration. What calibrations could Miranda’s presumptive rule undergo to mitigate some of its natural underinclusiveness?

This article will address this question. First, it will review the purpose for the Miranda warning and waiver requirement. Second, it will consider how the established warnings left criminal suspects vulnerable to the influence of an adverse inferential perception of guilt, resulting from silence in the face of allegation. Third, it will discuss the proclivity of criminal suspects to waive their Miranda rights. Fourth, it will discuss incongruity between the absence of a no adverse inference warning and the prohibitions of exploiting a suspect’s silence at trial. The article will then propose how adding this missing Miranda warning would more effectively align the original purposes of Miranda with the prophylactic actually used to protect the free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination and, in so doing, create symmetry between the investigatory and trial phases of criminal prosecution.

March 8, 2011 | Permalink

 

What is Collateral Review…..

Opinion on meaning of “collateral review” in AEDPA

The case is Wall v. Kholi. Here is the syllabus:

Respondent was convicted in Rhode Island Superior Court on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault and sentenced to consecutive life terms. His conviction became final on direct review on May 29, 1996. In addition to his direct appeal, he filed two relevant state motions. One, a May 16, 1996, motion to reduce his sentence under Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, was denied. The State Supreme Court affirmed on January 16, 1998. The second, a state postconviction relief motion, was also denied.

Read more here:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-868.ZS.html

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined, except as to footnote 3. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part.

March 7, 2011 | Pe

From Richard Friedman on last week Supreme Court case on confrontation….

Preliminary thoughts on the Bryant decision

Here are some preliminary observations on the opinions in Michigan v. Bryant. First, a brief review of the facts.

Responding to a 911 call, police found Anthony Covington on the ground near a service station in Detroit, profusely bleeding from a gunshot wound. As each officer arrived, he asked Covington what happened. Covington said that a man named Rick – the accused, Bryant – had shot him through a door at Bryant’s home, about six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier; Covington had managed to drive himself to the spot where he was found. Covington died several hours later of his wounds. Bryant was eventually extradited from California and tried for murder. The first jury hung, and a second one convicted him. Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court held that admission of Covington’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. The United States Supreme Court has now reversed that decision, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred in the result (on the ground, expected given his prior expressions, that the statements were not formal). Justices Scalia and Ginsburg wrote separate dissents.

Now, two over-arching thoughts:

(1) I believe the decision is a very unfortunate development for the Confrontation Clause. The approach that emerges is remarkably mushy, unjustified by any sound reasoning and virtually incoherent. It leaves courts ample room in many types of cases to characterize almost any type of statement as non-testimonial. It will be easily manipulable by governmental authorities and at times may distort their behavior.

(2) I believe this decision is in large part a result of the Supreme Court’s error in unduly restricting the scope of forfeiture doctrine in Giles v. California. In this case, there was substantial evidence, easily enough to justify a finding, that Bryant had killed Covington and therefore that he himself was at least the initial cause of his inability to cross-examine Covington. Given Covington’s condition, his death within hours, and Bryant’s flight, it does not appear that there was a reasonable opportunity to mitigate the problem by arranging a deposition. Accordingly, a court easily could have held that Bryant forfeited the confrontation right – had Giles not foreclosed the possibility by holding that even a defendant who murders a witness forfeits the right only if he commits the murder for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable. The bottom-line result of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision – that Covington’s statements were inadmissible – is singularly unappealing at a gut level, and I think it was inevitable that courts would compensate for the unavailability of forfeiture in cases like this by narrowing the confrontation right. See my post of June 29, 2008, Reflections on Giles, Part 2: Is Giles bad for defendants?