How long will Miranda last…..

I never thought the Miranda warning was all that useful.  In fact, it actually raises more questions than it answers.  For example, the warning tells a suspect that anything he says can be used against him in court.  But asking for an attorney is saying something, isn’t it?  Could the prosecutor later use such a request against him?  (After all, television teaches us that only guilty people “lawyer-up.”)  And what if the suspect wants to remain silent?  Could his silence be used against him in court?  The Miranda warning fails to answer these and many other questions.

Making matters even worse for the would-be defendant is Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).  In a confidence inspiring 5-4 split, the Court ruled that a suspect cannot actually exercise the right to remain silent by remaining silent—even if that silence lasts through nearly three hours of interrogation.

In response to all of this chaos, I’ve drafted a new and improvedMiranda warning.  Granted, this warning would be a bit more cumbersome for police to deliver, and still wouldn’t answer every possible question.  But it would be an improvement.  Here it goes:

“I first have to read you these rights before you tell me your side of the story, okay?  First, you have the right to remain silent.

  1. Actually, you really don’t have the right to remain silent, unless you first speak. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
  2. But if you choose to speak so that you can remain silent, you had better not be ambiguous.  If you tell me, for example, “I don’t got nothing to say,” that is ambiguous to me, and not because of the double negative.  Your ambiguity will be construed in my favor, and I am allowed to continue my interrogation. United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th Cir. 1996).
  3. On the other hand, if I am ambiguous when I read you your rights, my ambiguity will also be construed against you.  This is only fair.  Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
  4. If you refused to answer questions posed to you before I began reading you your rights, your pre-Miranda silence can be used against you at trial, should you testify in your own defense.  So, you might want to talk to me now so you don’t look guilty later.  Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
  5. But, anything you say to me can be used against you in court.  (I’m not sure if this includes the things that you say in order to remain silent.)
  6. You have the right to an attorney.
  7. But if you choose to exercise your right to an attorney, once again, you had better not be ambiguous about it.  Don’t ask me, for example, “Could I get a lawyer?”  This might seem like a reasonable request to you, since you’re handcuffed and have no other way to actually get the nameless attorney that I just offered you.  However, this statement is also ambiguous and is not sufficient to invoke your rights. United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000).
  8. If you can’t afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you, unless your income happens to be above the 1980 poverty line.  Then you might be on your own.
  9. And don’t say “I can’t afford a lawyer but is there any way I can get one?”  As you might have guessed by now, that is completely ambiguous, and lacks “the clear implication of a present desire to consult with counsel.”  The interrogation, therefore, must go on. Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994).

Now, do you understand these rights as I have read them to you, and would you like to take this opportunity to help yourself, waive your rights, and tell your side of the story?”

Michael D. Cicchini is a criminal defense lawyer and author of But They Didn’t Read Me My Rights! Myths, Oddities, and Lies about Our Legal System (Prometheus Books, 2010) as well as articles on criminal and constitutional law, available here.

What did they mean …..

Clancy on the Framers’ Intent and the Fourth Amendment

Thomas Clancy (University of Mississippi College of Law) has posted The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment (Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 86, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

For many years, I have relied on others to cull the historical records and have cited them to support what I thought was accurate historical reporting. In the past decade or so, there have been some broad claims about the historical record that contradict conventional wisdom. Those views have gained substantial traction. I believe that none of the prior accounts properly report or assess the origins of the Fourth Amendment and the central role John Adams played. That is the purpose of the article, which contains new information and adds a new context to the framing of the Amendment.

Courts and scholars seeking the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment have confronted two fundamental questions: what practices was the Amendment designed to regulate; how should a constitution regulate such practices? To inform the answers to those questions, this article offers a new perspective of, and information on, the historical record regarding the framing of the Amendment. It also presents for the first time a detailed examination of John Adams’ fundamental influence on the language and structure of the Amendment and his knowledge of, and views on, how to regulate searches and seizures.

Most of the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment was primarily the work of one man, John Adams. Upon examination, Adams stands out in the founding era as having profound opportunities to examine search and seizure practices and as having the most important role in formulating the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment. If the intent of the Framers is a fundamental consideration in construing the Constitution, as the Court has repeatedly told us it is, then John Adams’ knowledge and views should be considered an important source for understanding the Fourth Amendment. More fundamentally, Adams’ appreciation of search and seizure principles reflects a broader mosaic that demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment was the product of a rich jurisprudence on search and seizure. That jurisprudence offered a structured series of principles to regulate the search and seizure activities of that era and the Amendment was not merely a reaction to general warrants. Further, although the framing era sources did not always agree on the details of the criteria for regulating searches and seizures, they were united in seeking objective criteria to measure the propriety of governmental actions. That quest was firmly embedded into the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment.

The Wire…..

Alafair S. Burke (Hofstra University – School of Law) has posted I Got the Shotgun: Reflections on The Wire, Prosecutors and Omar Little (Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Wire is a show about institutions, the people trapped inside of them, and a society made static by their inaction, indifference, and ineptitude. Whether the series was exploring the drug trade, police departments, city hall, unions, or public schools, the individual actors within those systems were depicted as having little control over either the institutions or their individual fates within them. As a result, the constituencies supposedly served by those institutions continually got the shaft.

To say that The Wire is about the tolls of unmitigated capitalism and inflexible bureaucracies is not to say, however, that the show is silent on, or indifferent to, the criminal justice system that encompasses its main characters. I became especially intrigued by an episode in the first season in which police and prosecutors rely on the testimony of Omar Little in a murder trial, despite doubts about Omar’s first-hand knowledge of the crime. This essay is a reflection on the depiction of law enforcement in The Wire, both generally and with respect to the single scene that first made me a Wire addict.

Are we there yet….

Kreit on Federal Drug Laws and State Reform

Kreit alexAlex Kreit (Thomas Jefferson School of Law) has posted Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms (Chapman Law Review, Vol. 13, p. 555, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Nearly forty years after President Richard Nixon first declared a “war on drugs” (calling drugs the “modern curse of the youth, just like the plagues and epidemics of former years”) it seems the war may finally be coming to an end. In his first interview after being confirmed as the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske told the Wall Street Journal that he thought it was time to retire the war rhetoric when it comes to addressing drug abuse. At the state level, the past year has seen proposals to legalize marijuana introduced in a handful of states with polls showing approximately forty-five percent of Americans nationwide in support of the idea. Importantly, these recent developments follow nearly a decade and a half of successful drug reform measures at the state level on issues ranging from medical marijuana, treatment instead of incarceration, asset forfeiture, and marijuana decriminalization. In short, the argument that we should end the war on drugs in favor of a new approach no longer resides in the world of the politically unthinkable, and has quickly become a subject of serious policy and political discussion.

This Article considers how we might think about federal drug laws in a post-drug war context, particularly one in which states are increasingly passing laws that are at-odds with federal law. It argues that, when it comes to federal drug law, traditional debates about prohibition, legalization, or decriminalization turn out to be surprisingly unimportant. Instead, as states begin to enact new policies, the key question facing federal lawmakers and administration officials will be how to harmonize federal law with state reforms.

The Article’s argument proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the mounting evidence that the war on drugs strategy has proven to be an extremely costly and largely ineffective method for dealing with the problem of drug abuse. Part I also looks at how dissatisfaction with the current approach has led to increased interest in decriminalizing or legalizing marijuana, even at the federal level. Part II argues that the focus on debates over legalization or decriminalization at the federal level is misplaced. This is because, even if it wanted to, the federal government would not have the ability to unilaterally “legalize” or “decriminalize” any controlled substances. Using the example of medical marijuana laws as a case study, Part III contends that, just as the federal government does not have the ability to unilaterally decriminalize a drug, it also does not have the power to stop states from reforming their own laws. Part IV considers the implications of Parts II and III and concludes that they counsel in favor of reforming federal drug laws in a way that would respect states’ decisions to innovate in the area of drug policy, while also providing important controls and incentives to prevent against negative externalities in the form of spillover effects in neighboring states.

October 25, 2010 | Permalink

 

Something to think about…

John Roberts’ America

By Timothy Egan

I wish Chief Justice John Roberts could spend a day and a night in the Rocky Mountains experiencing what his activist Supreme Court majority has dumped on the American voter in 2010.

The sludge flow from out-of-state, secretive political groups is unrelenting. All hours. All mediums. A football game-break brings three attacks in a row, calling a senator a liar, a vandal and a glutton for debt. A weather update is interrupted by a trio of hits from the other side, making the challenger out to be the worst thing for women since Neanderthal man took up a club as an accessory to romance.

Colorado is ground zero for what’s happening in John Roberts’ America, competing for the dubious distinction of being the top state in the nation for spending by shadowy outside groups telling people how to vote.

This gusher is courtesy of the 5-to-4 Supreme Court decision in January that allowed unlimited campaign spending by corporations and unions. That was the ruling, which will go down in infamy, where the court said that corporations had the same free speech rights as ordinary citizens.

The illogic of that logic was always apparent. But now it’s overwhelming, and omnipresent. Your average voter can dash off a letter to the editor, or fire up a blog, or put up a yard sign — a nice fantasy of citizen democracy. Your corporate equal can spend $23 million (the outsider amount spent so far in Colorado) to bludgeon the electorate. And, with loopholes in the tax system, they can do it while making it virtually impossible to know who they are.

These corporate and union interest groups shouldn’t suffer in the arena of public debate, the court wrote in the Citizens United case, “simply because such associations are not natural persons.”

In the megaphone phase of this campaign to determine who will control the people’s Congress, the locals — those actual “natural persons” — are all but silent. Races in Colorado, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Washington state are being determined on K Street, by insurance, banking and oil industry groups hiding behind innocuous titles like Americans for Prosperity (right-wing billionaire David Koch) and Americans for Job Security (insurance giants), and by public employee unions.

Every day sets a new record. Last Friday, there were 1,200 television ads in Las Vegas for the Senate race.

I agree with those who say money doesn’t necessarily determine electoral outcomes. Meg Whitman, $140 million lighter and still trailing in her race for California governor, is exhibit A.

But the Citizens United decision of the Roberts court has fundamentally changed how we choose our leaders and our laws, all for the worse.

Here’s what’s happened: Spending by interest groups in this fall’s Senate races has gone up 91 percent from the same period in 2008, according to the Wesleyan Media Project. At the same time, spending by political parties has fallen 61 percent.

So corporations, whose sole purpose is to return money to shareholders, were given the legal right to be “natural persons” in our elections and are now overwhelming them. But political parties, which exist to promote ideas and governing principles, have seen their voices sharply diminished.

If the hell of Colorado’s current election season is what those isolated, black-robed kingmakers on the high court had in mind, you certainly didn’t see it in the nonsense of their decision.

“We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence of Citizens.

I can’t find any celebrating in Colorado, except by broadcasters cashing the checks of big special interest groups. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, by a large majority in the polls, agree on this: outside groups should not be allowed to dominate election spending.

The court missed the reality of what would happen once the floodgates were opened to the deepest pockets of the biggest players. They turned back a century of fine-tuning the democracy, dating to Teddy Roosevelt’s 1907 curbs, through the Tillman Act, against Gilded Age dominance of elections. They focused on a fantasy.

“The First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox or the lonely pamphleteer,” wrote Chief Justice Roberts.

Come to Colorado, your honor. You will see that those iconic individuals don’t have a prayer in the post-Citizens United world, let alone some broadcast time for the soapbox.

Here was the court’s prediction: “The appearance of influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” Really?

Perhaps the top complaint this year about the barrage of outside attack ads is that nobody knows who is behind them, which promotes the exact opposite of what the Roberts court predicted.

Celebrating yet? Get used to it. Though Republican-leaning special interests are currently outspending the other side by a 9-to-1 ratio, Democrats will soon follow Karl Rove’s lead and learn to bundle and hide wealthy contributors.

As ugly as 2010 has been, the next election cycle, for president in 2012, will bring us a John Roberts’ America that will make this year look like a town hall meeting from a Rockwell painting.

Timothy Egan is a columnist for The New York Times, where this article first appeared.


 

The Cost of Crime…

“Average Homicide Cost Is $17.25M, Study Concludes”

FindLaw has this story from Iowa State University. On the methodology:

An overwhelming majority of this high sum is the result of the amount of money citizens would be willing to pay to prevent future crime. The study also used the same formula to determine the costs of other crimes: rape ($448,532), armed robbery ($335,733), aggravated assault ($145,379), and burglary ($41,288).

October 19, 2010 | Permalink

 

Sentencing…

Kenneth Streit and John Chisholm have posted Sentencing Option: Why Restrict Judges? (Wisconsin Lawyer, Vol. 83, No. 9, September 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Dissatisfaction with parts of the indeterminate (parole) sentencing system led many states, including Wisconsin, to totally eliminate this and substitute a Truth-in-Sentencing system. After a decade with the new system, there are also many problems including difficulty in arranging programs, overcrowding and banishing the concept of rehabilitation. An adjustment would be to provide judges with both options at the time of sentencing so that the most serious offenders would be serving the fullest sentence while others would have earlier access to treatment and possible earned release.