“Victory for U.S. on detainees”

ScotusBlog has the story here:

The Supreme Court voted on Monday to leave intact a lower court ruling that took away almost all of the power of federal judges to block, even temporarily, the transfer of detainees out of Guantanamo Bay. The Court, in a brief order, denied review of the D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling in April in Kiyemba v. Obama (Supreme Court docket 09-581), now informally known as “Kiyemba II.” This marked a significant victory for the federal government, enhancing its authority to decide when and where to send detainees that are cleared for release from confinement without interference by federal judges and without challenge by detainees’ lawyers.

March 22, 2010 | Permalink

This is a good idea….

Paul C. Giannelli (Case Western Reserve University School of Law) has posted Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of Motivational and Cognitive Bias (Utah Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

One of the most controversial recommendations in the National Academy of Sciences report on forensic science — Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: The Path Forward — concerns the removal of crime laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies. For decades scholars have commented on the “inbred bias of crime laboratories affiliated with law enforcement agencies.” Some commentators have proposed independent laboratories as the remedy for this problem, and in 2002, the Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment proposed the establishment of an independent state crime laboratory. This essay documents the problems that triggered the NAS Report’s recommendation. It also examines the counter arguments as well as alternative approaches, including additional measures that should protect forensic analyses from improper influence.

Search of Auto

Barbara E. Armacost (University of Virginia School of Law) has posted Arizona V. Gant: Does it Matter? (2009 Supreme Court Review, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Arizona v Gant, it was standard practice under New York v Belton for police to conduct a search incident to arrest (SITA) of the passenger compartment whenever they arrested the driver or a recent occupant of the vehicle. Police officers had begun to treat the SITA of a vehicle as a powerful investigative tool, using traffic stops and arrests to get a free search for evidence of more serious crimes At least as a formal matter, Arizona v Gant changed all this. In Gant the Supreme Court reviewed a Fourth Amendment challenge to an automobile search incident to arrest conducted after the driver had been arrested, handcuffed and secured in the police car. The Court held that police may not do a SITA of an automobile once the arrestee “has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle” unless it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” For all practical purposes this holding means the end of Belton SITAs. It is standard protocol for police to order a potential arrestee out of his automobile, frisk him, handcuff him, and secure him in the officer’s vehicle. This means that SITAs of automobiles will almost never be justified.

Latest on Search and Seizure

The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because a sheriff’s deputy didn’t have a warrant or consent to enter an apartment where the defendant was found and there were no exigent circumstances that would justify the deputy’s entry and search of the apartment.
The Illinois Appellate Court, 2nd District, has reversed defendant Dejuan Davis’s convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. Lake County Circuit Judge Victoria A. Rossetti presided in the trial court.

After the defendant was charged in October 2007, he filed a motion to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the allegedly illegal entry into and search of his apartment.

At a hearing on the motion, John Willer, a Lake County sheriff’s deputy, testified that on Sept. 16, 2007, he responded to a call to assist another deputy in connection with a traffic altercation in Lake Villa. The defendant, his girlfriend and another man were accused of attacking Stephanie Harrison, who allegedly owed money to the defendant and his girlfriend for drugs.

Harrison told the deputy he knew the location of the girlfriend’s apartment in Antioch and that illegal drugs could be purchased at the apartment at any time. The deputy and several other officers went to the apartment and when they arrived, they heard several voices. Willer said he tried to open a door to the apartment but that it was locked.

When the defendant’s girlfriend came out of the apartment, she told the officers that the defendant was still in the apartment. Willer then entered the apartment although the defendant’s girlfriend never told him that he had permission to enter. When the defendant came out, he was arrested and Willer entered the apartment although he didn’t have permission to do so.

During a search of the apartment, Willer found a loaded handgun, a digital scale, a substance that was determined to be cocaine and cannabis.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that neither the defendant nor his girlfriend told Willer he couldn’t enter the apartment and that once the defendant and his girlfriend were arrested, it was necessary for the officers to enter the apartment because there were young children in the apartment who couldn’t be left alone. The court also noted that Willer had information that drugs were being sold from the apartment.

After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the drug charges and was sentenced to concurrent 11-year and five-year prison terms. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the deputy’s entry into the apartment was warrantless, non-consensual and not justified by exigent circumstances.

The appeals court agreed and reversed. The court said that absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a private residence to make a warrantless search or arrest. In this case, the appeals court said that Willer had neither a warrant nor consent to enter the apartment and that the entry and search were not supported by exigent circumstances.

“The evidence … does not support a finding of exigent circumstances because it does not suggest an immediacy or real threat of current danger or likelihood of flight,” the appeals court said. “Nor do the circumstances of this case indicate that the delay involved in obtaining an arrest warrant for defendant would have impeded the investigation or the apprehension of defendant.”

In addition, the appeals court said the police had no reason to believe that the defendant was armed or otherwise posed a threat to the police or others and there was no evidence that the police suspected the defendant of being armed. There also was no evidence that the defendant was likely to flee unless he was swiftly apprehended and so the doctrine of “hot pursuit” wasn’t applicable to the defendant.

“In sum, we conclude that Willer’s entry into defendant’s apartment and his discovery of the scale and white powder … were unlawful,” the court said. “Without the illegally seized evidence, the state could not prevail at trial because defendant’s convictions rested solely upon the illegally seized evidence and his statements that he owned the illegally seized evidence.”

People v. Dejuan Davis, No. 2-08-0168. Presiding Justice Kathryn E. Zenoff wrote the court’s opinion with Justices John J. Bowman and Ann B. Jorgensen concurring. Released Feb. 24, 2010.

Say Goodby to the Exclusionary Rule?

  Recently Professor Tim O’Neil of John Marshall Law School wrote…..”Be afraid. Be very afraid.”

He was writing about the impact that Justices’ Scalia, Thomas, Roberts and Alioto were having on criminal procedure.

The quartet were in the majority in two recent Supreme Court decisions that had placed the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule firmly on the endangered species list. (See  Professor O’Neil’s, “Exclusionary Rule Hanging On By a Thread,” Feb. 13, 2009). In 2006, the Roberts Court refused to exclude evidence recovered in a search following the failure of the police to properly “knock and announce.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586. Conceding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion for a 5-4 court claimed that “Suppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” And so, for the first time since the Exclusionary Rule was incorporated against the states in 1961, the Supreme Court refused to exclude evidence where the Fourth Amendment violation was caused solely by improper police behavior. Last year the Roberts Court took a second poke at the Fourth Amendment pi?ata. In another 5-4 decision, the Court appeared to raise the bar of police misbehavior that would justify exclusion. Herring v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009). Chief Justice John Roberts for the majority wrote that exclusion of evidence only “serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”

These decisions led Judge Richard A. Posner to opine that “[T]he exclusionary rule is bound some day to give way to [civil remedies].” U.S. v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2009).

DNA and Due Process

In District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne the Supreme Court confronted novel and complex constitutional questions regarding the postconviction protections offered to potentially innocent convicts. Two decades after DNA testing exonerated the first inmate in the U.S. the Court heard its first claim by a convict seeking DNA testing that could prove innocence.  Despite language suggesting the Court would not “constitutionalize the issue” by announcing an unqualified freestanding right, Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion proceeded to carefully fashion an important, but qualified and derivative procedural due process right. While denying relief to Osborne for narrow factual and procedural reasons, the Court’s ruling swept more broadly. The Court held that states with post-conviction discovery rules, as almost all have enacted, may not arbitrarily deny access to post-conviction DNA testing, and then pointed to the generous provisions of the federal Innocence Protection Act as a model for an adequate statute. The Court also continued to assume that litigants may assert constitutional claims of actual innocence in habeas proceedings.

From Brandon L. Garrett (University of Virginia School of Law)  has posted DNA and Due Process (Fordham Law Review Vol. 78, 2010) on SSRN.

Mandatory Minimums

Deborah Fleischaker, director of state legislative affairs for Families Against Mandatory Minimums, has this piece at Jurist:

[T]here is no evidence to suggest that repealing mandatory sentences would lead to an increase in crime. In fact, states that have significantly reformed mandatory minimums, as Michigan did in 1998 and 2003, have not experienced increasing levels of crime. More and more states – notably, both red and blue states – are employing proven alternatives, such as drug courts and risk-based sentencing policies, which are more effective and cost-efficient than lengthy, mandatory sentences, especially when dealing with non-violent drug offenders